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MISSOURI

'CASES
TORT LIABILITY OF AN A-u0ro1AOBILE OWNER.

HAYS V. HOGAN.'-This

was an action against the defendants, father and son, to recover for a
death caused by the negligence of the defendant son in operating an
automobile. The machine was owned by the defendant father who
had purchased it for general family use. The son lived with his
father's family and was permitted to use the machine for his own
pleasure and was so using it when the accident occurred. The Springfield Court of Appeale decided that the son was the agent and servant
of his father operating the machine in his father's business and that
the latter was therefore liable for the acts of the son."
Is a father, the owner of an automobile kept for and used
by his family, liable for the torts of a member of the family committed
while operating the automobile purely for his own pleasure and in the
father's absence?
1.

(1.914)

165 S. W. 1125.

2. Plaintiff had a verdict in the circuit court but a new trial was awarded
by the trial Judge on two grounds, one of which was, thai he was not clear
as to the liability of the father under the law and evidence. Upon appeal the
Springfield Court of Appeals reversed the order for a new trial and directed
judgment to be entered for the plaintiff, but Sturgis, J., upon a motion for a
rehearing changed his views and had the case certified to the Supreme Court.

(30)

NOTES ON

RECENT MISSOURI

CASES

The relation of parent and child does not in itself Involve the
relation of master and servant.3 And the father is not liable
because
4
of having entrusted a dangerous instrumentality to another.
"The authorities are in accord in holding that in an action based
on the negligent running of an automobile the owner of the car who
was not present at the infliction of the injury cannot be held liable
,except it be shown that the person in charge not only was the agent
or servant of the owner but also was engaged, at the time, in his
master's business."
There are three classes of cases involving a
parent's liability in which this rule Is applied: first, where an injury
has occurred to the plaintiff through the negligence of a hired chauffeur, acting at the request of a member of the owner's family whose
directions he has been accustomed to obey; second, where an Injury
occurs while a member of the family is acting as chauffeur for other
members of the family whose directions he has been accustomed to
obey; and, third, where there is a permissive use of a family car by
a member of the owner's family for his own pleasure during which
the injury occurs.
I. The father-owner is liable In the first class of cases.5
The
court in Winfrey v. Lazarus,' held, In such a case, that the chauffeur
was acting within the scope of his employment since the evidence
showed that the owner had left his machine and chauffeur at his
daughter's disposal and that her orders were equivalent to the master's.
Cohen v. Borgnecht, and Moon v. Matthews,' are in accord with the
Missouri case. These cases are based on the proposition that one may
delegate the direction of his servants to another, and when the servants act under those directions they are obeying their master's orders
and engaged in his business. However the cases In this first class
are to be distinguished from Hays v. Hogan and- other cases of the
third class."°
3. Needles v. Bark (1884) 81 Mo. 572; Basset v. Riley (1908) 131 Mo. App.
676; 111 S. W. 596. Nor does the relation of husband and wife create the relation

of master and servant. Parley v. Stroch (1896) 68 Mo. App. 85; Thompson v.
Kehrman (1895) 60 Mo. App. 488. Of course, if an automobile owner entrusts

his car to an incompetent person, he is liable for resulting injuries for the

owner's act in that case constitutes negligent use of the machine. See cases
cited in note 5.
4. It is universally held that an automobile is not, per se, a dangerous
instrumentality. See cases cited in note 5.

5. Daily v. Maxwvell (1911) 152 Mo. App. 415, 133 S. W. 351; Stewart v.
Baruch (1905) 93 N. Y. S. 161; Clark v. Bucknobile Co. (1905) 94 N. Y. S. 771;
Reynolds v. Back (1905) 127 Iowa 601; Jones v. Hoge (1906) 47 Wash. 663:
Patterson v. Kates (1907) 152 Fed. 481; Cwaninghaia v. Castle (1908) 111 N. Y.
S. 1057; Howe Y. Leighton (1910) 75 N. H. 601.

6. Cases in the first and second classes are often cited in cases of the
third class as holding the father-owner liable under the facts of the third class.
7. (1908) 148 Mo. App. 388, 128 S. W. 276.
8. (1910) 144 N. Y. S. 388. The decision was put on the ground that
the chauffeur was not only In the employ of the defendant and subject to his
control but was also acting in obedience to his general orders.
9. (1910) 227 Pa. St. 488.
10. In Winfrey v. Lazarus, the decision was rested squarely on the ground
of delegated authority. In Cohen v. Borgnecht (1910) 144 N. Y. S. 388, 400,
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II. In McNeal v. McKain,1 a son of the owner was acting as
chauffeur for his sister and a family guest. It was held that the son
was not performing a service independent of his father but that he
was a servant acting under his master's orders, just as the hired
chauffeur in the first class of cases, and that the father-owner was
1
liable. Stowe v. Morris," and Smith v. Jordan,3 are in line with McNeal v. McKain. The father is liable because the request by a member
of the family, under the facts, is equivalent to a direction by the
owner to his son, as his hired man, to perform for him a service.
The cases of this class are also to be distinguished from Hays v.
1
Hogan and other cases of the third class. '
5
III. By way of dictum in Daily v. Maxwell," it was said, "Should
we regard the relationship between the two defendants (father and
son) merely as that of owner and chauffeur-master and servantthe owner should not be held liable for the negligence of the chauffeur
since the evidence shows beyond question that the latter was using
the machine merely for his own pleasure." Continuing, the court said
the boy was more than a mere chauffeur; that he was the son of the
owner using the car with his consent and for one of the uses for which
the vehicle was kept; and concludes, "that in running the car with
the consent of his father and within the scope of family uses, [the
boy] was the agent and servant of his father." The same court in
Marshall v. Taylor," apparently approved the dictum of Daily v. Maxwell, but it might well have relied upon the defendant's failure to disfacie case made by the plaintiff and have reached
charge the prima
1
the same result.

7

it was said, "While the authorities hold that where even a member of the
owner's family or an employee borrows an automobile and uses it for his own
purpose the owner cannot he held liable, I am of the opinion that said authorities
do not ap ply to the case at bar."
33 Okla. 449, 126 Pac. 742.
11. (912)
12. (1912) 147 Ky. 386, :144 S. W. 52.
13. (1912) 211 Mass. 269, 97 N. E. 761.
14. In McNeal v. McKain, the court indicates the distinction in this statement, "We are not to be understood as here approving the length to which the

rule is extended in that case [Daily v. Maxwell, which holds the father-owner
liable in a case of the third class] for it is not essential to determine that question in order to dispose of this case." Stowe v. Morris does not distinguish
the cases but might well have done so. It is said in Smith v. Jordan, "If the

act is not done by the son in furtherance of his father's business but for his
own pleasure the father is not liable."
15. (1911) 152 Mo. App. 415, 133 S. W. 351.
16. (1913) 168 Mo. App. 240, 153 S. W. 527.
17. In Shamp v. Lanbert (1909) 142 Mo. App. 567, it was held that the
plaintiff made out a prima fac4e case against a vehicle owner-by showing his
ownership, and the burden Is ten on the defendant to show that it was not
being used in his business. Therefore, since the evidence in Marshall v. Taylor
failed to show that the son was using the machine for his own pleasure, the
father might well have been held liable without relying upon Daily v. Maxwell.
T'his doctrine of prima facie case by proof of ownership, was mentioned by the
court in Hays v. Hogan, but it is inapplicable to that case because the undisputed evidence was that the son was using the automobile for his, own pleasure.
if the jury disbelieved it, as the court Intimated in order to bring the case
within the rule of Sharnp v. Lambert, still the trial judge could properly grant
an order for a new trial because he thought the prima facie case rebutted by
the defendant's evidence.
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In Doran v. Thomsen,18 the father-owner was held not liable and
in disapproving an instruction that the jury should regard the pleasure
of the family as the business of the father, in a case of the third
class, the court said, "It bases the creation of master and servant
upon the purpose which the parent had in mind in acquiring ownership of the vehicle and Its permissive use by the child. This proposition ignores an essential element In the creation of that status as
to third persons, that such use must be in the furtherance and not
apart from the master's service and control, and fails to distinguish
between a mere permission to use and a use subject to the control
of the master and connected with his affairs." Maher v. Benedict,1
Reynolds v. Buck,20 Tanzer v. Read,2 1 Parker v. Wilson, 2 and Heissenbuttel v. Meagher,"2 are in line with Doran v. Thomsen and contra to
Hays v. Hogan and Daily v. Maxwell. Davis v. Littlefleld,2' Birch v.
Abercrombie,2 and Keyser v. Van Neat 20 hold the father-owner liable.
The statement from Doran v. Thomsen, above-quoted, points out
the fallacy of the Missouri cases. The creation of the relation of
master and servant should not be based upon the purpose which the
parent had in mind in buying the automobile and the permissive use
by a member of his family. One might keep an automobile for the
use of the members of a club, the students of a certain echool, the residents of a certain town, or for the general public; yet who will say
in case he permits such persons to use the machine and they
injure a third party, that the relation of master and servant existed,
and that in using the automobile for one of the purposes for which
it was bought, the club-man or the student, or a member of the general
public was in the business of the owner and that he Is, therefore, liable
for their acts?27
If public interest demands that ownership coupled with a permissive use of an automobile by a member of the owner's family be
made a basis of liability for Injuries to third parties, 8 this result can
be reached only by a departure from the established law of agency.
18.

19.

20.
21.

(1908) 76 N. J. L. 754.
108 N. Y. S. 228.
(1905) 127 Iowa 601.
(1914) 145 N. Y. S. 708.
(1908)

22. (AL,
1912) 60 So. 151.
In this case the authorities are
reviewed and the classes herein made recognized. In commenting on Daily v.
Maxwell (third class), Stowe v. Morris (second class) and Moon v. Matthews
(first class) the Alabama court said, "The first case is closely in point and
clearly holds for appellant. In the second, there were members of the family
other than the driver in the machine. The third may be discriminated on the
very substantial ground that the machine was being operated by a driver
regularly employed for the purpose." The court then adopts the rule of Doran
v. Thoma8en holding the father-owner not liable.
23. (1914) 162 N. Y. App. Dlv. 752.
24. (S. C., 1914) 81 S. E. 487.
25. (1913) 74 Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020.
26. (Minn., 1914) 146 N. W. 1091.
27. See 28 Harvard Law Review 734.
28. 75 Central Law Journal 43.
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It is submitted that Sturgis, J., was right in holding Hays v. Hogan
2
in conflict with Walker v. Wabash Railroad, and Garretson v.
0

Duneckel1
HUsBAND's LIABILITY FOR WIFE'S TORTS.

L. W.
CLAXTON v. PooL.-As a

consequence of the common law conception of husband and wife as a
unity, the husband was made liable for all torts of the wife, whether
committed before or during coverture. When committed under the
husband's coercion or when, the act being done in the husband's
presence, the law would raise a presumption of coercion, the husband
alone was liable; when committed with the authorization of the husband, but in his absence, both were jointly liable; when committed in
the husband's absence, and without his direction or instigation, or
when the presumption arising from his presence was rebutted, the
husband and wife were liable together, though the tort was considered
that of the wife alone.2 Various incidents of the marriage relation
have been assigned as reason-s for this doctrine, such as the husband's
absorption of the wife's property,' his power and duty to control the
wife,' and the wife's legal incapacity to sue and be sued.5
In some jurisdictions, statutes have expressly abrogated or limited
the common law rule.
Generally, however, the rule exists, except in
so far as it is impliedly affected by the statutory conferment upon
the wife of the capacity to sue and be sued as a femme sole, and of
the ownership and control of her separate property. In a number
of jurisdictions, it is held that such statutes have impliedly abolished
the rule of the husband's liability by taking away the reasons which
supported it. 7 Perhaps the more generally accepted view, however,
is that the courts, in accordance with the principle of strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common law, should refuse to
infer the abolition of the long-established rule, the precise reasons for
which are uncertain. 8 But most authorities agree that the husband is
29. (1894) 121 Mo. 575, 26 S. W. 360.
80. (1874) 50 Mo. 104. This and the case of Walker v. Wabash Railroad
follow the well-established rule of agency that the agent must be engaged in the
business of his master else the master Is not liable for his acts.
1. (1914) 167 S. W. 623.
2. Schouler, Domestic Relations, § 75; Dailey v. Houston (1874) 58 Mo.

361; Merrill v. City of St. Louis (1882) 12 Mo. App. 466.
3. Martin v. Robson (1872) 65 III. 129; Norris v. Gotkill (1884) 32 Kan.
409; Schuler v. Henry (1908) 42 Col. 367, 94 Pac. 360.
4. Nichols v. Nichols (1898) 147 Mo. 387, 48 S. W. 947; McQueen v. Fulgham (1864) 27 Tex. 463.

5. Capel v. Powcell (1864) 17 C. B. (N. S.) 744.
6. See 1 Stimson, American Statute Law (Supp.) § 6404, and cases cited
in 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1003.
7. MartIn v. Robson (1872) 65 Il1. 129; Norris v. Corkill (1884) 32 Kan.
409; Lane v. Bryant (1896) 100 Ky. 138, 37 S. W. 584.
8. Nichols v. Nichols (1898) 147 Mo. 387, 48 S. W. 947; Morgan v. Kenaedy
(1895) 62 Minn. 348, 64 N. W. 912; Serolca v. Kattenberg (1886) I. R. 17
Q. B. D. 177. Upon the general subject of this paragraph, see collection of
-ases in 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1003 and 25 L. R. A. (N'. S.) 840.
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no longer liable for such torts of the wife as are directly connected
9
with the care and management of her separate estate.
The Missouri courts have refused to infer the abolition of the
common-law rule from statutes" giving the wife the ownership and
control of separate property, and permitting suit against her alone
and the enforcement of judgments against 'her separate property."
In Nichols v. Nichols,'" the court, in reaching this conclusion, construed
the statute" exempting the husband's property from "debts and liabilities" incurred by the wife before marriage as having relieved the
husband of liability for ante-nuptial torts, and declared that this partial abrogation of the common law rule negatived an intention to
abrogate the whole; it was asserted that the husband's common law
liability rested not alone upon his absorption of the wife's property,
but. also upon his power and duty to control the conduct and actions
of the wife, and that, this reason remaining, the rule was not without
foundation. This case and later ones 14 approving it leave no doubt
as to the continuance of the general rule of the common law in Missouri.
A novel exception to the rule is now introduced by the Springfield
5
Court of Appeals in the case of Claxton v. Pool,' which has been certified
to the Supreme Court on the dissent of Robertson, P. J. Judgment
was rendered in the circuit court against the defendants, husband and
wife, for the alienation of the affections of the plaintiff's husband. The
evidence showed that the defendant wife had maintained improper
relations with the plaintiff's husband, which resulted in the latter's
separation from the plaintiff. Rumors of his wife's misconduct had
reached the defendant husband, who, protesting his wife's innocence,
gave them no credence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment as to
the wife but reversed it as to the husband. The evidence was insufficient
to hold the latter except upon the husband's common-law liability for
the wife's torts, and he was exempted from that liability on the ground
that his wife's conduct had violated her marital duties and had thereby
inflicted upon the husband an injury equal to or greater than any
done the plaintiff. The court declared that "a husband is not liable
and has never been held liable at common law for the wrongs of his
wife to a third person by reason of her conduct where such conduct
is also a violation of her marital duties to her husband."
9. Rowe v. 8mith (1871) 45 N. Y. 230; Wolff d Co. v. Logier (1902) 68
N. J. L. 103 52 AtL. 303; Pomeroy, Remedies and Remedial Rights, §§ 320, 321,
and cases cited; Flesh v. Lndsay (1892) 115 Mo. 1, 21 S. W. 907, cited in
14 L. R. A., supra., as opposed to this rule.
10. Revised Statutes 1909, §§ 8304, 8309.
11. Wirt v. Dinan (1891) 44 Mo. App. 583 ; Nichols v. Nichols (1898) 148
Mo. 387, 48 S. W. 947; Taylor v. Pulle (1899) 152 Mo. 434, 53 S. W. 1086;
Bruce v. Bombeck (1899) 79 Mo. App. 231.
12. (1898) 148 Mo. 387, 48 S. W. 947.
13. Revised Statutes 1909, § 8310.
14. Supra, note 11.
15. Supra, note 1.
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Admitting, as does the court, that the husband's liability is
well settled in this State as a general principle, it seems that neither
reason nor justice demands an exception simply upon the ground of
equal or greater damage to the husband. If the basis of the general
rule is, as announced in Nichols v. Nichols, the husband's duty to
control the wife, should he be any less responsible to a third person
for her conduct simply because that conduct resulted in injury to
himself as well as to the third person? Suppose a wife slanderously
accuses her husband and a woman, A, of having had improper relations. Apparently, the same principle would exempt the husband,
in an action for slander brought by A, since he had suffered equal
injury with A. Yet no reason that may be advanced in support of the
general rule will permit of an exception in such a case; nor does it
seem just that the husband should be allowed to set up his damages
against those of the plaintiff so as to deprive the latter of a remedy
she admittedly would have, had she been the only one harmed by the
wife's wrongful act. Other cases might be supposed which would
work a more palpable injustice to injured third parties. If it is a
hardship upon the husband to hold him liable in such cases, the
remedy lies in the repudiation of the general rule, rather than in the
making of seemingly arbitrary exceptions.
The court, to support the principle of its decision, invokes the aid
of cases holding that the husband is not liable for necessaries supplied
the wife while she is living apart in adultery."6 There doe,3 not seem
to be as good reason for holding that the violation by the wife of her
marital duties should excuse the husband from liability for her torts
as for holding that It relieves him from liability for necessaries. The
latter liability Is imposed chiefly to insure the performance of the
husband's duty to the wife,' 7 while the liability for torts Is imposed
primarily for the protection and benefit of third persons, and should
not be cut off by the wife's breach of duty, so long as the legal relation
of husband and wife exists. But it is not necessary to decide this
point in the principal case. For though it be admitted that the analogy
drawn is sound, the facts will not allow its application. It is not shown
that the wife's conduct afforded the husband a ground for divorce or
that it violated her marital duties; the husband was cohabiting with
the wife when the conduct occurred that wronged the plaintiff; he
was not deprived, so far as appears, of any of his marital rights, and
consequently was not relieved of any of his marital obligations; he
admitted no damage, but protested all the while his wife's innocence
16. Atkyns v. Pearce (1857) 2 C. B. (N. S.)763; Ktng v. Fldntan (1830)
1 B. & Ad. 227.
17. Sauter v. Scrutchfleld (18S7) 28 Mo. App. 150; Black v. Bryan (1857)
18 Tex. 467; Bergh v. Warner (1891) 47 Minn. 250, 20 N. W. 77; Shelton v.
Pendleton (1847) 18 Conn. 417; Peck, Domestic Relations, § 3.
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of any wrongful conduct. These facts seem to preclude the application
of the principles laid down by the majority, even if the principles
themselves are tenable.
D. H. L.
RECOVERY FOR MENTAL ANGUISH. WALL v. ST. Louis, ETC. R. R. Co.'
-Where mental anguish alone has resulted from a purely negligent
act of the defendant, no jurisdiction allows recovery. Where the defendant is acting negligently and not intentionally, there can be no
compensation for mental pain disconnected from bodily injury.2 The
reason for this rule is the opportunity for fraud in the proof of the
suffering and the supposed unreasonableness of requiring one merely
negligent to guard against fright and its consequences.
This rule raises the question as to how far recovery may be had
where there is no physical injury inflicted by the defendant's negligent
act, but where fright occasioned by his negligence results in sickness.
When recovery is permitted it is based on the physical injury caused
by negligence and not on the Intervening mental disturbance., The
fright must be the natural and proximate consequence of the defendant's negligent act.' The rule as stated in Sedgwick on Damages, 5
is that where the negligence of the defendant causes fright, and as
a natural and proximate consequence bodily ills follow, or if fright
produces nervous disturbances, and these in turn physical ailments,
defendant is liable for the physical results though there was no actual
external injury at the time of the accident. But this is not the rule
in Missouri. No damages are recoverable for mental anguish caused
negligently apart from physical Impact,' though such damages would be
recoverable for injuries received In connection with that impact. This
is a purely arbitrary distinction. If the courts allow a passenger in a
railroad collision who has a finger mashed to recover for all mental
anguish sustained as a result of the wreck, there is no good reason
why a passenger in a similar situation should not recover who has
suffered no physical injury, but who from fright has become so ill
as to be confined in a hospital for several months. Crutcher v. The
Big Four Ry. Co.7 holds that there can be no recovery for physical
injury caused solely by mental distress, since such is not the natural
and proximate consequence of defendant's act. Where on the other
hand, mental suffering results from physical injury such as a battery
inflicted by the defendant, the universal rule is that special damage is
1.

(1914) 168 S. W. 257.

2. Strange v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co. (1895). 61 Mo. App. 586; Deming v.
Chicago, etc. By. Go. (1899) 80 Mo. App. 152; Grayson v. St. Louis Transit Co.
(1903) 100 Mo. App. 60, 71 S. W. 730; Harless V. S. W. Elec. Co. (1907) 123
Mo. App. 22, 99 S. W. 793.
3. Purcell v. St. Paul R. B. Co. (1892) 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W. 1034.
4. Hill v. Kimball (1890) 76 Tex. 210, 13 S. W. 59.
5. (9th ed.) § 43h.
6. Shellabarger v. Morris (1906) 115 Mo. App. 566, 91 S. W. 1005.
7. (1908) 132 Mo. App. 311, 111 S. W. 891.
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not necessary to maintain Lhe action, and anguish of mind so produced
Several Missouri cases Intimate that
is a proper subject of recovery.
even future mental anguish may be considered in cases where the
injury complained of has resulted in the loss of an eye or limb, or
in some external physical injury that mars the beauty or symmetry
9
of the body.
Besides battery, there are other torts which require no special
2
10
damage, such as libel, asault," false imprisonment, and trespass
13
In all such cases recovery may be had for all damage
to realty.
which the plaintiff may prove including mental suffering. But in torta
requiring special damage, such as slander not actionable per se and
deceit, mental anguish alone is not such special damage as to be a
basis for recovery. If, however, the defendant Intentionally causes
4
mental anguish, a recovery is allowed for such suffering.
,There are a few cases involving rights in property In which such
a consideration becomes necessary. As a general rule personal property
is not of such character that injury to it would result in mental
5
For this reason the courts have seldom
anguish to the owner.'
allowed recovery for mental suffering In cases involving personal
property.'0 In Missouri the matter resolves Itself into a question of
the nature of the tort. Whether the injury be to real or personal property, recovery may be had for mental anguish resulting therefrom,
Thus In
if the injury be inflicted in a wilful, malicious manner.'
8
actions for unlawful eviction recovery is allowed for mental anguish.
The same Is true In cases of unlawful and malicious disinterment of
dead bodies,'0 and also where there is unlawful and malicious mutila2
tion of dead bodies. ' Although there are few cases in point, " we may
assume from the language of the cases above cited that no recovery
may be had if the injury to the body was merely negligent.
The law of contracts furnishes a close analogy here to the law
8. Butts v. Ylat'l Ex. Bank (1903) 99 Mo. App. 168, 72 S. W. 1083:
Kennedy v. St. Louis Transit Co. (1903) 103 Mo. App. 1, 78 S. W. 77 ; lVaechter
v. St. Louis, etc. R. P. (1905) 113 Mo. App. 270, 88 S. N1. 147.
9. McGuire v. St. Louis Transit Co. (1903) 103 Mo. App. 459, 78 S. W

835: Berger v. C. & A. R. R. Co. (1902) 97 Mo. App. 127, 71 S. W. 102; Kennedy
v. St. Louis Transit Co., supra; Batten v. St. Louis Transit Co. (1903) 102 Mo.
App. 285, 76 S. W. 727.
10. Baldiwin v. Boutware (t899) 79 Mo. App. 5.
11. Happy V. Prichard (1905) 111 Mo. App. 6, 85 S. W. 655.
12. Hawk v. Ridgway (1864) 33 Il. 473.
13. Bessemer Land Co. v. Jenkins (1895) 111 Ala. 135, 18 So. 565.
14. Houston v. Wolley (1889) 37 Mo. App. 15.
15. White v. Dresser (1883) 135 Mass. 150; Henry v. Southern R. R. Co.
(1912) 93 S. C. 125, 75 S.E. 1018.
16. Yoakum v. Kroeger (1594) 27 S..W. 973 (Tex.).
17. Carter v. Oster (1908) 134 Mo. App. 146, 112 S. W. 995.
18. State v. Weinel (1883' 13 Mo. App. 583.
19. Mea hierv. Driscoll (1868) 99 Mass. 28; Bessemer Landw Co. v. jenkiss
(1895) 111 Ala. 135, 18 Southern 565.
20. Larson v. Clhase (1891) 47 Minn. 307, 50 N. W. 238: Hasard v. Lehane
(1911) 128 N. Y. Supp. 161; Koerber v. Patec (1905) 123 Wls. 453, 102
N. W. 40.
21. Freely v. Andrews (1906) 91 Mass. 313, 77 N. E. 766.
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of torts. Special damage is never necessary in order to maintain an
action for breach of contract; whether there can be compensation for
mental anguish will depend entirely upon whether it is a proximate
consequence of the breach. In the great majority of contracts, mental
anguish is not the proximate consequence and recovery is not allowed.
This is on the theory previously stated that there can be no recovery
2
In recent times a
for mental suffering apart from physical injury.
broader rule is being adopted which the Missouri courts are follow2
ing. In the Tennessee case of Wadsworth v. The Western Union, "
the court says, "When other than pecuniary benefits are contracted for,
other than pecuniary standards will be applied to ascertain the damages flowing from the breach." It is true that pecuniary loss only is
contemplated as a breach of most contracts, but where it is clear
that mental anguish will result from the breach, such anguish is rmade
2"
Where the contract naturally involves
the basis for further recovery.
mental suffering in case of breach, as in breach of promise of marriage 2 5 and contracts to preserve a dead body 2 damages may be reMissouri follows this rule and allows
covered for such suffering."
recovery when the contract is of such nature that the breach would
28
But this rule Is not
cause mental anguish as a natural result.
extended to telegraph cases. No recovery is allowed for mental anguish
2 9
In several states such
resulting from the late
delivery of a telegram.
30
recovery is allowed.
While the general rule obtains in this state that a recovery for mental
anguish must generally be connected with personal injury, any number of
cases show that where an act is accompanied by malice, insult, or wilful3
ness, a recovery may be had though there is no physical injury. 1 The
33
recent Missouri case of Wall v. St. Louis & S. F. 1. R. Co. clearly
illustrates this rule. In this case the agents of the defendant wilfully
and maliciously threw a trunk upon the box and casket containing
the remains of plaintiff's mother. Plaintiff, who was present at the
22. Trigg v. St. Louis R. R. Co. (1881) 74 Mo. 147; Schouitz v. St. Louis
R. R. Co. (1893) 119 Mo. 256. 24 S. W. 472; Shellabarger v. Morris (1.906) 115

Mo. App. 566, 91 S. V. 1005.
23. (1888) 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S. W. 574.
24. Itenihoan v. Wright (1890) 125 Ind. 536, 25 N. E. 822.
25.
26.
27.

Wilbur v. Johnson (1875) 58 Mo. 600.
Renihan v. Wright, so pra.
Smith v. Leo (1.895) 36 N. Y. Supp. 949 ; Galveston R. R. Co. v. Rubio

(1901) 65 S. W. 1126 (Tex.).

28. Carter v. Oster, supra; Shellabarger v. Morris, supra.
v. Western Union (1893) 54 Mo. App. 434; Burnett v.
29). Zewman
Western Union (1890) 39 Mo. App. 599; Connell v. Western Union (1893) 116
Mo. 34, 22 S. W. 345.
30. Western Union v. MeNair (1898) 120 Ala. 99, 23 So. 801; Western
Union v. Fisher (1900) 107 Ky. 513, 54 S. W. 830; Graham v. Western Union
(1903) 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 91.
31. Trigg v. St. Louis It. R. Co., supra; Sc/un itz v. St. Louis R. 1. Co.,
supra; Deming V. R. R. Co. (1899) 80 Mo. App. 152; Snyder v. Wabosh R. R.
(1900) 85 Mo. App. 495; Hickey v. Welch, supra; Rawlings v. Wabash B. R.
(1903) 97 Mo. App. 511, 71 S. W. 535; Harless v. Elec. Co. (1907) 123 Mo.

App. 22, 99 S. W. 793.
32. (1914) 168 S. W. 257.
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time, suffered great mental anguish due to the breaking of the casket
and bruising of the body. It was held that while a corpse is not
property in the commercial sense, the courts have come to recognize
and declare what is termed a quasi-property right which entitles the
husband or wife or next of kin to the possession or control of the
body.88 On this view one may recover for injury or indignity to a
corpse as though he had a property right to it. 3 ' "There are torts," said
the court, "of which mental distress alone Is the natural and proximate
result and for which damages may be assessed when it appears that
the tortfeasor's conduct is inhuman, insulting, and malicious, and the
tortious act was wilfully and wantonly done. This rule obtains alike
in the case of the wilful and intentional abuse of, or an indignity
committed upon a dead body in the presence of plaintiff or next of
kin. 5 The case is clear--the whole recovery for mental anguish alone
rests upon the nature and quality of the tort. If wilful, malicious,
and inhuman, recovery is Invariably allowed for mental anguish resulting therefrom.
G. L. D.
FAILURE OF REcoRD ro Ssow ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA. STATE V.
O'KELLEY.1-The conference of judges 2 has frequently recommended
t6 the legislature of MisEouri to pass a positive law to the effect that
the failure of the record in a criminal appeal to show an arraignment
and plea shall not be a ground for reversal. Such a statute has not
been passed. No doubt, "the inherent power of the court, which originated the doctrine to satisfy seeming requirements of the social state,
which no longer exist, may properly be used to lay it aside as a legal
curiosity." 8 In May, 1914, the Supreme Court in State v. O'Kelley
unanimously affirmed the decision of the Springfield Court of Appeals,'
that a conviction will not be reversed for this omission in a misdemeanor case. This departure from the once orthodox doctrine shows
the force of the re-action against the inviolability that has in the past
century been accorded to a defendant's rights and privileges.
A great many other states, with a line of decisions and statutes
similar to those in this state, have preceded our courts in taking this
step. Georgia, seemingly the first state, took it in 1866.8 Since that
time, sixteen other states have made similar rulings.
In a few

33. Litteral v. Litteral (1908) 131 Mo. App. 306, 11 S. W. 872; 1Wilson v.
St. Louis R. R. Co. (1912) 160 Mo. App. 649, 142 S. W. 775.
34. Larson v. Chase (1591) 47 Minn. 307, 50 N. XV.238; Douglas v. Stokes
(1912) 149 Ky. 506, 149 S. W. 849.
35. Wilson v. St. Louis, etc. R2. R. Go., supra.
1. (1914) 167 S. W. 980.
2.

498.

3.

Revised Statutes 1909, § 3892.

Marshall, J., In Hack v. State (1910)

141 Wis. 346, 124 N. W. 492,

4. (1914) 173 Mo. App. 169, 157 S. W. 1055.
5. Bryans v. State (1856) 34 Ga. 323. The decision was made without
statute on the analogy to a 'alver in a civil case.
6. Ark.: Moore v. Stote (1880) 51 Ark. 130, 10 S. W. 22.
Ill.: Spicer v. State (1882) 11 Il. App. 294. Dictum. in a misdemeanor case.
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jurisdictions, the ruling has been limited to misdemeanor cases; I in
most, it includes the lesser degrees of felonies; while some courts have
extended it to capital cases. 8 The misdemeanor cases are rested upon
the principle, that never, as In felonies, has the same strictness in
procedure been required, while the further extensions of the rule are,
almost without an exception, placed upon the ground that the statute
limiting reversals in criminal cases to prejudicial errors has impelled
the decision.
The real function accomplished by the arraignment and plea is
the making of an Issue to be tried by the judge or jury. The incidental function of the arraignment, to officially notify the defendant
of the offense he is charged with, is quite generally held susceptible
of being waived either by expression or conduct.9 The formation of
an issue, however, is a matter of substance and cannot be dispensed
with. 0
State v. O'Kelley was a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor
under the local option law."
When the case was called for trial,
both sides announced "ready for trial." After the jury was sworn
and the information read and before the introduction of any testimony, the counsel for the defendant for his statement to the jury,
said, "we plead not guilty." The record on appeal from a conviction
in the lower court, failed to show an arraignment and plea.
Such an error had been held fatal by the Missouri courts since
the decision of State v. Andrews 12 in 1858. Cases of this sort came
up with such frequency that the Supreme Court disposed of State v.
Williams 1' in 1893 with the summary remark, "There was no arraignment of defendant before he was put on trial, and, of course, this
Ind.:

John v. State (1886) 104 Ind. 557, 4 N. H. 153.

Iowa: State v. Greene (1885) 66 Iowa 11 23 N. W. 154.
Ky.: Meece v. Oommonwealth (1880) 78 Ky. 586.
Kan.: State v. Cassadqy (1874) 12 Kan. 42S.
Mass.: Gommonwvealth v. McKenna (1878) 125 Mass. 397. Verity was
not Imputed to the record in this case.
Mich.:

People v. Weeks (1911) 165 Mich. 362, 130 N. W. 697.

Neb.: Ailpn v. State (1887) 21 Neb. 593, 33 N. W. 212.
Miss.: Bateman V. State (1887) 64 Miss' 233 1 So. 172.
N. Y.: People v. Osterhout (1884) 34 Run 240.
Okla.: Wood v. State (1910) 40 Okla. Cr. Rep. 436, 112 Pac. 11.
S. 0. State v. Moore (1889) 30 S. C. 69, 8 S. E. 437.
S. D.: State v. Reddington (1895) 7 S. D. 368, 64 N. W. 170.
Wash.: State v. Straub (1896) 16 Wash. 111, 47 Pac. 227.
Wis.: Hack v. State (1910) 141 Wis. 346. 124 N. W. 492.
Fed.: U. S. v. Malloy (1887) 31 Fed. 19 (misdemeanor). But see
Grain v. U. S. (1896) 163 U. S. 625 (felony).
7. Illinois, Indiana, S. Carolina and Circuit Court of the U. S.,citations
in note 6.
8. Kentucky, Oklahoma, S. Dakota and Washington, citations in note 6.
9. For a good collection of cases on this point, see People v. Weeks (1911)
165 Mich. 362, 130 N. W. 697.
10. In Grain v. U. S., supra, it was stated by way of dictuam that a
statute denying the right of arraignment and plea to a defendant would violate
the fourteenth amendment.
11. Revised Statutes 1909, § 7246.
12. 27 Mo. 267.
13. 117 Mo. 379, 22 S.W. 1104.
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cause must be reversed for that reason."
The only indication of
reluctance in applying this rule is in State v. Vanhook, " the court
remarking, "after the jury is sworn and the trial proceeds and all
the testimony relates to the guilt or innocence of the accused, in
a misdemeanor case, it looks like trifling with justice to reverse the
judgment because the record fails to show an arraignment and plea of
not guilty."
In the principal case, no weight can be given to the statement
of the counsel to the jury, "we plead not guilty," for the plea must
be made before the jury i:s sworn."5
Nor can the fact that it is a
misdemeanor explain the decision, for it has been repeatedly held
that an arraignment and plea is as essential in misdemeanors as it
Is in felony cases."0 The case, then, in point of fact being absolutely
irreconcilable with past decisions,' if explainable at all, must rest
on statute.
There are two statutes which are clearly applicable. Section
5165 "1 of the Revised Statutes of 1909, provides that upon arraignment, "in all cases when he does not confess the charge to be true,
a plea of not guilty shall be entered, and the same proceedings shall
be had, in all respects, as if he had formally pleaded not guilty."
The second statute deals wi:h reversals for defects not appearing upon
the face of the indictment. It is part of the statute of jeofails O and
provides that proceedings In a criminal case shall not be held invalid
"for any other defect or imperfection which does not tend to the prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits." To
conclude, however, that the failure of the record to show an arraignment and plea is an unprejudicial error, It must appear from the
record that In substance the defendant was accorded an arraignment
and plea, since the record in a criminal case is unimpeachable, 20 and
a plea and arraignment is a matter of substance.
By the first of these statutes, "not guilty" catches all conduct save
a confession of the charge.2 ' The record in State v. O'Kelley is silent
as to a confession; the announcement of "ready for trial" and the
trial itself are consistent with nothing but a plea of not guilty. The
record, then, shows In substance a plea of not guilty and such a plea
waives the necessity of a formal arraignment. 2 It does seem, there14.

(1885) 88 Mo. 105.

18.

Originally passed in 1835.

15. State v. Weber (1855' 22 Mo. 321.
16. State v. Geiger (1891' 45 Mo. App. 111; State v. Mikell (1907) 125
Mo. App. 287, 102 S. W. 19; State v. Moss (1912) 164 Mo. App. 379, 144 S. W.
1109.
17. See State v. Geiger, supra, for a prosecution under the same statute,
with practically the same record, where the omission was held reversible error.
19.

1879.

20.

Revised Statutes 1909,

Revised Statutes 18315, 1). 485.

§ 5115.

Added to the statute of Jeofails in

State v. Clevenger (1837) 25 Mo. App. 655; State v. Blunt (1892) 110

Mo. 322.
21. State v. Andrews, suwpa; State v. King (1881) 74 Mo. 612.
22. State v. Braunschzeeig (1865) 36 Mo. 397; State v. Grate (1878) 63
Mo. 22; State v. Weedea (1895) 133 Mo. 70.
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43,

fore, that the oversight of the regular arraignment and plea is but
a "defect or imperfection which does not tend to the prejudice of
the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits." 23 Though
the Missouri courts have for thirty-five years overlooked the combined effect of these two statutes, this Is their logical result, and it
24
prevailed immediately in other states.
As to the extension of this rule, on sound principle, it should
include all crimes, for in the highest degree of crime, an arraignment
and plea accomplishes no more nor less than in the lightest misdemeanor. Faris, J., however, in his dicta, has stopped short of
capital crimes.
R. BURNETT.
LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION TO
COMPLY WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS AS TO ADMISSION INTO THE
STATE. BRITISH AMERICAN PORTLAND CEMENT CO. V. CITIZENS' GAS CO.1

-The power of the state to exclude a foreign corporation from its
limits, or to exact conditions for allowing the corporation to do business in the state, is generally recognized. 2 Most states have seen fit
to impose some restrictions on the power of foreign corporations to
do business within their jurisdiction. Differences in the wording of
the statutes have necessarily led to different views in the various
states.
Revised Statutes 1909, § 3037 provides that "before" any
foreign corporation shall be allowed to transact business, or continue
in business, in this state, it must establish an office in the state and
comply with certain other requirements therein stated. § 3039 provides that foreign corporations, "now or hereafter doing business in
this state, shall file with the secretary of state" certain papers and
pay a license tax and obtain a license to do business. § 3040 provides
a penalty for failure to comply with the preceding sections, and in
addition to the penalty, provides that no non-complying corporation
"can maintain any suit or action, either legal or equitable, in any
of the courts of this state, upon any demand, whether arising out of
contract or tort." 4
The thing intended to be prevented by this statute is the doing
of business by a foreign corporation in this state without having complied with the conditions set out in the statute. The only rights of
28.

State v. West (1884) 84 Mo. 440, was the first case to arise after-

the introduction of this passage. The error was held fatal, without a consideration of this statute.
24. See dates of cases In note 6.
1. (1914) 164 S. W. 468.
2. Silver Mining and Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania (1888) 125 U. S., 181;
State em inf. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co. (1906) 194 Mo. 124, 91 S. W. 1062;
S Cook, Corporations (7th ed.) §§ 696-700.
3. See Beale, Foreign Corporations, Chap. VII, where the statutes of
the various states are collected.
4. These sections were first enacted in 1891. Laws of Mo. 1891, p. 75.
Identical provisions are In force In other states. Hurd's Illinois Statutes (1903)
p. 486, chap. 32, §§ 67b, 67c, 67d; Burns' Annotated Indiana Statutes (1901)
§§ 3461a, 3461b, 3461c.
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the corporation which are affected, if any, are those arising out of the
conduct of business in the state.5 The first case to arise under the
Missouri statute was Wil'Nams v. Scullin,O decided three years after
the statute was passed. The St. Louis Court of Appeals, on a motion
for rehearing, said that a contract growing out of the business of a
non-complying corporation was "voidable" and "could not be enforced
anywhere, if its enforcement was resisted." 7 The Kansas City Court
of Appeals, when the question came before it in 1897, held the contract to be "invalid." I In 1898 that court held that the contract of
the non-complying corporation was "void." 0 The court relied entirely
on what is now § 3037, saying that the section prohibited the carrying on of business in thi, state by a foreign corporation which had
not complied with the requirements of the section, and that any contract made in doing an act prohibited by the statute was void. In
view of the fact that § 3037 provides that "before" any corporation
shall be authorized to do business It must establish an office in this
state, etc., the reasoning of the court would be justifiable but for
§ 3040.'0 The question came before the Supreme Court in Tri-State
Amusement Co. v. Amusement Co.," where it was held that the contract of the non-complying; corporation was void. The court said the
statute prohibited a foreign corporation's doing business in this state
until it had complied with the requirements stated in the statute and,
thereby, made contracts entered into in carrying on such business
"void." 12
In Handlan-Buck Mfg. Co. v. Wendelcin Construction Co.,"3 the
St. Louis Court of Appeals held that, as between two claimants in
interpleader, the validity o:f a bill of sale of the property in controversy
to one of them by a non-complying foreign corporation could not be
questioned. The Supreme Court in Roeder v. Robertson '4 held that
in such an attempted sale the title to the property remained in the
5. State ex rel. v. Grinn
(1911) 239 Mo. 135, 143 S. W. 483 (semble)
Roeder V. Robertson (1906) 202 Mo. 522, 100 S. W. 1086: Tri-State Amusement
Go. v. Amusement Go. (1905) 192 Mo. 404. 421, 90 S. ) W. 1020; United Shoe
Machinery Co. v. Ramlose (1910) 231 Mo. 508, 538. 132 S. W. 1143.

6. (1894) 59 Mo. App. 30.
7. This case Is cited In Ehrhardt v. Robertson., infra, and Tri-State
Amusement Go. v. Amusement Co., infra, as holding the contracts Invalid. The
court does use the word "Invalid" once but the statement given above would
seem to show that the courts used "voidable" in Its strict technical sense.
8.
9.

Blevins v. Fairley (1897) 71 Mo. App. 259.
Bhrhardt v. Robertson Bros. (1898) 78 Mo. App. 404.

10. As to the effect of § 3040 see infra, p. 45 and note 20.
11. (1905) 192 Mo. 404, 90 S. W. 1020.
12. Expressly followed in Chicago Mill and Lumber Co. v. Sims (1906)
197 Mo. 507, 95 S. W. 344; Wilson-Aloline Buggy Co. v. Priebe (1907) 123
Mo. App. 521, 100 S. W. 558.
The contracts were also held void In Roeder v. Robertson (1.906) 202 Mo.
522, 100 S. W. 1086; First Nat'l Bank v. Leeper (1906) 121 Mo. App. 688, 97
S. W. 686; Amalgamated Lead & Zinc Co. v. Bay State Zinc Mining Co. (1909)
221 Mo. 7. 120 h. W. 31; Ui'dted Shoe Machinery Co. v. Rainlose (1907) 210
Mo. 631, 109 S. W. 567, (1910) 231 Mo. 508, 132 S. W. 1143.
13. (1907) 124 Mo. App. 349, 101 S. W. 702.
14. Note 11 supro.
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corporation. If the title never passed out of the corporation, it is
difficult to understand how the court could sustain the claim of one
who relied solely on such an attempted transfer of title. The decision
is not in accord with the previous holdings of the Missouri courts as
1
to the validity of the contracts of non-complying corporations.
in
Central
Still another phase of this question was presented
Coal & Coke Co. v. Optimo Lead & Zinc Co."s A foreign corporation,
which had not complied with the laws of Missouri, made a deed of
trust to defendants. While the trustee's sale was pending, plaintiffs,
who were judgment creditors of the non-complying corporation, filed
a bill in equity to have the deed of trust set aside. The court considered at length the intention of the legislature in passing §§ 30373040. It concluded that it was not the intention of the legislature
to prevent an innocent party who contracted with a foreign corporation which had not complied with the statute from enforcing the
1
contract; and refused relief to plaintiffs. 7 The case in this regard
8
It
does not seem to be in accord with previous Missouri decisions.'
has, however, a sound basis in estoppel. The plaintiffs claimed under
the corporation, and acquired no more rights than it had. The corporation by contracting represented that it was capable of making
the contract and the other party had reasonably acted upon that
representation to his damage. The doctrine of estoppel has been
19
recognized in Missouri.
The question is one of statutory construction. It is not surpris.
ing that the courts should differ. As the cases just discussed indicate,
the Missouri Courts have construed the intention of the legislature
to be that any contract made by a non-complying corporation is void,
and on this construction, the cases are sound. But the construction
of the statute is subject to criticism. "The legal presumption is that
the legislature specified all penalties it intended to impose, and it
-0
is not in the province of the court to inflict more by construction.
these
with
inconsistent
is
contracts
such
of
invalidity
The
terms of the statute, because, if they are void, neither party can
maintain a suit upon them, and the prohibition of the maintenance
of such suits by the foreign corporation was futile. . . . The evident intention of the legislature and the legal effects of the statute,
were, in accordance with the plain words it contains, to leave such
contracts valid, enforcible in all the courts by the parties to them
15.

See cases cited in note 11 supra.

16. (1911) 157 Mo. App. 720, 139 S. W. 525.
17. See discussion of similar construction infra.
18. Cases cited In note 11 8upra.
19. The court in Central Coai & Coke Co. v. Optimo Lead & Zinc Co.
(p. 728) mentions this as another possible basis for its decision and cites
Young v. Guad (1908) 134 Mo. App. 166, 113 S. W. 735, which is in point.
20. See Blodgett v. Lanyons Zin Co. (Kan.. 1903) 120 Fed. 893 and
cases there cited. See also Cohmbus Ins. Co. v. Walsh (1853) 18 Mo. 229: 9
Michigan Law Review 51: Downing v. Ringer (1841) 7 Mo. 585 (coutra).
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other than the unqualified foreign corporations, but unenforcible in
the state by them, and to subject them to a penalty of $1000." 21
Further, the failure to comply with the corporation laws is an
offense against the state and not against private persons. A defendant sued by a corporation upon a contract made with it cannot question the right or authority of the corporation to make the contract,
or to transact business in the state in which it is made. The ouster
or dissolution of the corporation, or an injunction against its proceed22
ing at the suit of the state is the only remedy available.
The constitutionality of § 3040, in so far as it provides that no
suit can be maintained, was discussed in the recent case of British
The court"2
American Portland Cement Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co."
in dictum 25 said that if if. was the intention of the legislature to close
the doors of the courts of this state to any litigant, a citizen of the
8
United States, it would be unconstitutional (1) under Section 10 of
27
Constitution of Missouri, and (2) under "the due
2
of
the
Article
8
process of law" clause of the Constitution of the United States, and (3)
amendfourteenth
of
the
clause"
immunities
and
under the "privileges
29
Such a statute would clearly violate Section 10 of Article 2
ment.
It may
of the Constitution of Missouri. A corporation is a person.
have certain valid and enforcible demands, which do not arise out of
business carried on in this state. To deprive it of the right
to use the courts of the state to enforce such demands would be a
clear violation of Section 10 of Article 2 of the Constitution of Missouri. It would not be depriving the corporation of its property with21.

Dunlap v. Mercer (Minn., 1907)

156 Fed. 545, 557:

to the same

effect is Blodgett v. Lanyon Zinc Co. (Kan., 1903) 120 Fed. 893.
22. Blodget v. Lanyon Zinc Co., supra; Iowa, etc., Gold Mining Co. v.
United States F. & G. Co. (Iowa, 1906) 146 Fed . 434, 440 and numerous

authorities cited there; 9 Michigan Law Review 53 and collection of authority
given there.
23. (Mo., 1914) 164 S. W. 468.
24.

Brown, Walker, and Graves, JJ., dissenting.

25. It was dictum because under the facts as stated by the court no.
contract was ever entered into. The company then did not give up title to the
$10,000 in

the hands of Campbell, who was in

fact the agent of the company

to pay over the money to the Gas Co. on the happening of certain conditions.
The corporation then under Roeder v. Robertson, supra, had a right to sue in
the state court and recover its property. The court in British-Amercan, etc.
Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co. mentions this on page 478. As to the $2000 paid in
Oklahoma, the corporation, clearly, could recover, the statute not applying.
See note 4, ante.
26. The court uses the term "citizen" throughout the opinion as includSuch is not the generally accepted view as to the meaning
ing a corporation.
of that term. See note 31, infra.
courts of justice shall be upen to every person
27. Art. 2, Sec. 10:."'Tho
and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character,
and that right and justice sh)uld be administered without sale, denial or delay."
28. Const. U. S. Amend. 14, § 1.
29. Const. U. S. Amend. 14, § 1.
30. Santa Clara Co. v. So. Pac. RV. Co. (1885) 118 U. S. 344, 396;.
Smyth v. Ames (1897) 169 f. S. 466, 522; Daggs v. Oriental Ins. Co. (1896)
136 Mo. 382, 391 ; 3 Cook, Corporations (7th ed.) §§ 696-700.
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2
The corporation still has the rights but
out due process of law.
cannot enforce them in Missouri. It would not be a law "abridging
the privileges and immunities of citizens of United States" or denying
to citizens of each state the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
2
several states, a corporation not being a citizen. 1
of the statute in
the
interpretation
we
have
seen,
however,
As
Missouri is not that it excludes the foreign corporation from the courts
entirely, but that contracts made in carrying on business in the state
before compliance are void. No rights accrue to the corporation under
such a contract, and it has no reason to invoke the aid of the courts.
On any demand not arising out of business in the state, the courts are
2
It is equally clear that making the
open to the foreign corporation.
contracts void does not deprive the corporation) of its property without due process of law. The corporation is left in the same position
it was in before it attempted to make the contract. If it has parted
with its property under the void contract, the courts are open to it
to recover it.
Not being a citizen, it cannot attack the constitutionality of the
law as denying the citizen of one state the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the several states, or as "abridging the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States." To hold otherwise would
be to give to a foreign corporation all the rights of corporations in
the other state without complying with any regulations of such state.
2
Such is unquestionably not the rule. '
Machinery
Co. v. Ramlose "7 suggested
court
in
United
Shoe
The
that if the statute prohibited any suit by the foreign corporation
it would be unconstitutional under the provision of the Constitution
of the United States which provides that "no state shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 80
Under the interpretation assumed or under the interpretation given
the statute by Missouri courts, the statute could not come under the
prohibition of that provision of the constitution. The statute prohibits doing business, and denies the foreign corporation the right to
come "within the jurisdiction" until it has complied. The corporation

31
Oriental Ins. Co. v. Daggs (1898) 172 U. S. 557; Daggs v. Oriental
Ins. Co. (1896) 136 Mo. 382. 392. 38 S. W. 85; Paul v. Virginia (1868)
8 Wall. 168; 3 Cook, Corporations. §§ 696-700; State es rel. Ins. Co. v. Blake

(1911) 241 Mo. 100, 109, 144 S. W. 1094. The loose use of the term citizen is
perhaps responsible for the erroneous conclusion on this clause In British Ame-tcan Portland Cement Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co.
32. A corporation is a person within the meaning of the Constitution.
Covington Turnpike Co. v. Sanford (1896) 164 U. S. 578, 592, and authorities
cited there; Smyth v•.Ames (1897) 169 U. S. 466, 522; 3 Cook, Corporations
(7 ed.) 4 696-700.
3. "Roeder v. Robertson, supra; United Shoe Machineryu Co. v. Ramlose,
supra.
34.

See

note

2,

supra, and

Paul v.

Virginia (1869)

8 Wall.

168.

This assumes that the state allows incorporation of corporations similar to the
foreign corporation.
f.

36.

(1910) 231 Mo. 508, 538.
Const. U. S. Amend, 14, § 1.
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not being within the jurisdiction, the statute is not in conflict with
the constitutional provision guaranteeing to persons within the jurisdiction equal protection of the laws. 7
From the foregoing considerations, we may conclude that in Missouri any demand of a non-complying corporation arising out of Its
business in the state is void, and that the dictum in British American
Portland Cement Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co. In so far as it concerns Section 10 of article 2 of the Constitution of Missouri is sound, but that
under the Missouri construction of the effect of the statute, it is
constitutional.
K. B.
EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY. MCINTYRE v. TEBBETTS. 1-- The principle of
the common law that a master is not bound to indemnify a servant
who Is injured through the misconduct or negligence of a fellowservant is well established.2 Three limitations have been engrafted
upon this rule. One class of cases holds that employees of different
grades, the superior having the right of superintendence, direction
and control over the inferior, are not fellow-servants; this is referred
to as the superior servant doctrine.3 Another class of cases holds
that a laborer in one department of service Is not a fellow-servant
of a laborer in another separate and distinct department of service; I
this limitation arises out of the fact that servants are not so associated
and related in the performance of their work that they can observe
and influence each other's conduct and report delinquencies to a correcting power. The third limitation, and that which extends the
master's liability most effectively, is the dual capacity doctrine. It
permits the same person to act as a fellow-servant and a vice-principal;
i. e., while he is engaged as a laborer with other laborers he is a
fellow-servant, but while he directs and controls others he represents
the master and is a vice-principal.5
The earlier decisions of' Missouri categorically rejected the superior
servant doctrine." In Marshall v. Schricker,7 the Missouri decisions
were reviewed, and the court decided that the power of superintendence
and control is not the test of a vice-principal. The law regulating
37. State ex rel. Atl. Horse Ins. Co. v. Blake (1912) 241 Mo. 100, 144
S. W. 1094.
1. (1914) 165 S. W. 757.
2. McDermott v. Pacific Ry. Co. (1860) 30 Mo. 115; Rohback v. The
Pacific R. R. (1869) 43 Mo. 187; Priestly v. Fowler (1837) 3 M. & W. I;

Murray v. The South Carolina Railroad Go. (1841)

1 McMullan

(S.

C.) 385;

Farwell v. The Boston and Worcester Railroad Co. (1842) 4 Met. (Mass.) 49.
3. Schroeder v. The C. & A. R. R. Co. (1891) 108 Mo. 322, 183 S. W. 1094:
Dowltng v. Allen (1876) 61 Mo. 528; Foster v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1892) 115
Mo. 165, 21 S. W. 916; Russ v. Wabash Western (1892) 112 Mo. 45, 20 S. W.
472. 4.
Koerner v. St. Louis Car Co. (1907) 209 Mo. 141, 107
S. W. 481.
5.

English v. Roberts, Johnson & Rand Shoe Co. (1909)

6.

McDermott v. Pacific Railroad Co., supra; Rohbace V. Pacific R. R,

7.

(1876)

122 S.W. 747.
supra.

63 Mo. 308.
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the liability of' the master remained the same up to 1881, when, in
8
Dowling v. Allen, the rule was changed to an acceptance of the
superior servant doctrine. This decision marks a complete discontinuance of the theory of the earlier cases, although it had been
observed in McGowan v. St. L. & I. M. R. B. Co. that, "there was no
proof that the conductor had the superintendence or control over the
men or the work, or the power to provide or replace machinery." A
1
similar observation had been made in Marshall v. Schricker." These
observations may be said to have foreshadowed the decision of Dowling
v. Allen, which was followed consistently until 1900, when Grattis v.
K. C. P. & G. R. R. Co.11 determined the master's liability by the
authority of the vice-principal to represent him as to the so-called
personal or non-delegable duties toward the servant.
,The departmental doctrine has not been accepted by our courts
in the broadest sense, and Grattis v. K. C. P. & G. R. R. Co. criticised it
upon the ground that it was impractical in its application, since it
is impossible to define the limits of departments within the meaning
of the doctrine. But in Koerner v. St. Louis Car Co.,12 the court
refused to subscribe to this criticism of the departmental doctrine.
The later cases apply it without defining just what are departments
of service, saying, "the rule itself must remain general and its application specific as the cases arise." i"
The last stage in the development of this phase of the employer's
liability is the adoption and application of the dual capacity doctrine
or dual service theory. The earlier decisions in Missouri refused to
recognize this doctrine," although the principal was first stated in
Harper v. Indianapolis R. R. Co.," the court saying that a "superintendent may also labor like any other co-laborer, and when acting only
as a laborer may be likened to that of any other." This was repeated
in Rowland v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co.," however, Dayharsh v. Hannibal &
St. J. R. R. Co.7 refused to apply it, and in Hutson v. Mo. Pac. Ry.
Co.," the court expressly rejected it, saying, "that in this case we
have the unusual fact that the injury was directly inflicted by the
foreman himself while engaged in the work as a co-laborer with
5. (1881) 74 Mo. 13.
9. (1876) 61 Mo. 528.
10. (1876) 63 Mo. 308.

(1900) 153 Mo. 380, 55 S. W. 108.
12. (1907) 209 Mo. 141, 107 S. W. 481.
13. Koerner v. St. Louis Car Co., supra. To the same effect, McMurray
v. St. L.. I. M. & S. R. R. Co. (1909) 225 Mo. 272, 125 S. W. 751; Schumaker
v. K. C. Breweries Co. (1912) 247 Mo. 141, 152 8. W. 13; Tabor v. St. L., 1. M.
& S. t. R. Go. (1907) 210 Mo. 385, 109 S. W. 764.
14. Hutson V. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. (1892) 50 Mo. App. .00; Houghlett v.
Ozark Lumber Co. (1892) 53 Mo. App. 87.
15. (1871) 47 Mo. 580. See also Moore v. Wabash R. R. Co. (1885) 85 Mo.
11.

588. 16.
17.
18.

(1886) 20 Mo. App. 463.
(1890) 103 Mo. 570, 15 S. W. 554.
(1892) 50 Mo. App. 300.
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plaintiff. Does this fact alter the relation of the parties or interfere
with the master's liability? Our opinion is that it does not." Fogarty
v. St. Louis Transfer Co.L9 is referred to as the leading opinion in
this state on the dual capacity doctrine 20 although the court there
expressly applied the law of Illinois and not of Missouri. In the latter
case, the court said, "if the negligence complained of consists of some
act done or omitted by one having such authority which relates to his
duties as a co-laborer with those under his control, and which might
just as readily have happened with one having no such authority the
common master will not be liable, but when the negligent act complained of arises out of arid is the direct result of the exercise of the
authority conferred upon him by the master over his co-laborers, the
master will be liable."
The most recent application of this doctrine is found in McIntyre
v. Tebbetts,' where it was held that the driver of a wagon which the
plaintiff was assisting to load and unload, whose act in suddenly
starting the wagon caused the plaintiff's injury, was a fellow-servant
of the plaintiff, though lie had several hours before the accident
employed the plaintiff to assist in loading and unloading the wagon.
The dual capacity doctrine is invoked with peculiar force in this
case since the alleged vice-principal was charged with two-fold duties;
he was a co-worker with the wagon crew in addition to his power to
,supervise and control the laborers under him; however, the main part
of his task was to drive the team and wagon in the capacity of a
common laborer. In determining that the master was not liable In
this case it may be admitted that the employee's general relation was
that of vice-principal, since it is the character of' the act being done
at the time of the injury which determines whether two employees
are fellow-servants. At the instant of starting the team the employee
was performing an act which clearly pertained to his express duties
as a co-laborer, and might just as readily have happened had he had no
R. BUNs.
such general authority.
19.

20.

(1903)

180 Mo. 490, 79 S. W. 664.

Stephens v. Deatherage Lumber Co. (1904) 110 Mo. App. 398, 86 S. W.

481; Depuy v. Chicago, R. L & P. 1. R. Co. (1904) 110 Mo. App. 110, 84 S. W.
103; Radtke v. St. Louis Basket & Bom Co. (1905) 229 Mo. 1, 129 S. W. 508:

iollueg v. Bell Telephone Co. !1905) 195 Mo. 149, 93 S. W. 262; Neves v. Green
21. (1914) 165 S. W. 757.

.(1905) 111 Mo. App. 634. 86 3. W. 508.

